The increased demand and pressure on boards with regard to accountability issues has been evident in Codes for Practice of Corporate Governance, nationally and internationally . One recommended action is that boards should perform an evaluation of their work. Although board evaluations are viewed as a recent development, they have been part of the corporate governance discussion over the last two decades. Most prevailing European Codes developed for listed companies recommend that board evaluations are performed, including the Norwegian Code for Practice of Corporate Governance for listed companies in Norway (Norwegian Code), stating that "the board should evaluate its performance and expertise annually" (NUES 2012:34) . In a corporate governance context, an evaluation will enable the board to assess actual performance against a set standard, and if actual performance deviates from a set standard, corrective actions may be taken. Thus, board evaluations are viewed as important in terms of assessing the effectiveness of boards (Ingley and van der Walt 2002 , Leblanc 2005 , Leblanc and Schwartz 2007 , Long 2006 , Gabrielsson and Huse 2004 , Kiel and Nicholson 2005 . However, no research has been conducted to see if board evaluations actually measure board effectiveness.
In this article, accountability is used to conceptualize if board evaluations measure board effectiveness, applying general theories, board role theories and behavioral theories for creating accountability (Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles 2005) . Accountability and value creation are treated as synonyms assuming that the purpose of any board is to contribute to value creation.
Different levels of board effectiveness have been identified by applying the question of "value creation for whom?"
The Norwegian corporate governance system regarding boards of directors assumes a stakeholder approach to boards and governance (Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2009 ), given corporate co-determination through corporate assemblies, employee elected directors, and regulations regarding gender balance in the board (Rasmussen and Huse 2011) . The Norwegian Code uses a stakeholder approach in explaining the purpose of the Code, "ensuring the greatest possible value creation over time in the best interest of shareholders, employees and other stakeholders" (NUES 2012:6) , but is developed by investor and shareholder groups and assumed to have a strong investor perspective (Rasmussen and Huse 2011) .
A unitary and balancing firm internal or firm external perspective on boards and value creation, as discussed in Huse and Gabrielsson (2012) and Huse (2007) , was used to identify different levels of board effectiveness. The highest level --board performance --uses balancing and firm internal perspectives on boards and value creation, assuming board commitment should be to create value for the firm, a perspective which may be traced back to the resource dependency theory and the team production theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Blair and Stout 1999) .
A lower level of board effectiveness, conformance to content, uses a unitary and firm external perspective on value creation--value creation for external stakeholders/owners -- (Huse and Gabrielsson 2012) identifying expectations regarding boards in the Norwegian Code. The lowest level, conformance to context, uses a unitary and firm internal perspective on value creation-value creation for boards. In this context; performing any board evaluation is considered to be a measure of board effectiveness. Given the lack of empirical research, the conceptual literature on board evaluation was used to identify characteristics of a board evaluation process that could measure board effectiveness. Through multiple case studies in nine of the largest listed Norwegian companies in terms of market capitalization, and using the board evaluation process as the unit of analysis, it was possible to compare the implemented board evaluation process to the indicators of a board evaluation process measuring board effectiveness as identified in the literature.
The research shows that board evaluation in large Norwegian listed companies is performed to conform to context as a consequence of the recommendation in the Norwegian Code. Although evaluation to conform to context represents a certain level of board effectiveness, the data indicate that the implemented process is more likely to represent value creation for boards and board members, given that boards' performing evaluations are perceived as professional.
Although the research should be understood in a Norwegian context it should add to the literature on board effectiveness, using accountability as a construct. Additionally, the study should add to the literature on behavioral aspects of boards. Practically, the research may help boards in designing board evaluation processes that can measure board effectiveness, or it can be used in developing future Codes. The article starts by defining board evaluations and presenting the rationale for them. Then board evaluation as a mechanism to assess board effectiveness is presented, building on previous research on board effectiveness that identified the link between board effectiveness and accountability.
Propositions are presented and explained through the existing literature on board evaluation processes, followed by a presentation of the methodology, before the findings are discussed and conclusions made. The article ends with a few suggestions for future research.
The European Code
As early as 1994, The Blue Ribbon Commission published the report, "Performance Evaluation of CEOs, Boards and Directors, followed by the report, "Board evaluation:
Improving Director effectiveness" in 2000 (Long 2006) . Most European Codes recommend that board evaluations are performed (Rasmussen 2008 (Rasmussen 2010 ).
Board evaluations: Definition and rationale
Board evaluations are defined as evaluations where the boards as a whole, or the individual directors, are evaluated. They can be performed by the board itself or by someone on behalf of the board (Kiel and Nicholson 2005 , Leblanc 2005 . In a corporate governance context, board evaluation is about assessing boards' work.
General theories and board role theories can explain what boards do, while behavioral theories may explain how boards work. From the perspective of board role theories and general theories, different tasks have been identified as important for boards to be engaged in.
The different roles and tasks vary as a consequence of the focus these theories have on "value creation for whom". Agency theory Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983) , focuses on various control tasks, applying a firm external perspective and ensuring value creation for external stakeholders/owners. Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Huse and Gabrielsson 2012) , and team production theory (Blair and Stout 1999 , Kaufman and Englander 2005 , Huse and Gabrielsson 2012 ) use a firm internal and balancing perspective where boards are engaged in tasks related to providing service and knowledge to the company and creating value for the firm.
Institutional theory, interlocking theory, and class hegemony theory explain the role and tasks of boards from a firm internal and unitary perspective, focusing on value creation for internal actors and business elites (Huse 2007) . Given that boards perform various tasks, and that board evaluations are about aligning actual and expected task performance, a pluralistic view on board tasks is applied. If the rationale for recommending board evaluation is based on their ability to measure board effectiveness (Levrau and Van den Berghe 2007) , the question is, what is board effectiveness and how can it be measured?
Much of previous research focuses on board composition and structure as input to board effectiveness, using financial indicators as proxy. The limitation of these studies is that they measure board effectiveness based on a board's form, not performance. Other researches use board processes to measure company performance, focusing on the role of the board in terms of tasks and purposes (Zahra and Pearce Ii 1989 , Forbes and Milliken 1999 , Carpenter and Westphal 2001 , Hillman and Dalziel 2003 , Nicholson and Kiel 2004 , arguing that, while board structure conditions board effectiveness, the behavioral dynamics of a boards, and the relationship between the board members determine board effectiveness (Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles 2005) . The pluralistic approach in these studies is the same as here, arguing that this is important to fully comprehend board behavior.
Literature discussing board evaluation identifies the rationale for introducing board evaluation in terms of increased accountability, defined as "doing what you are supposed to do" (Huse 2007:35) . It is argued that demand for increased accountability was initiated by shareholder activism , Long 2006 , Van der Walt and Ingley 2001 , where shareholders demanded that boards demonstrate leadership and control (Kiel and Nicholson 2005) . Others argue that, in general, external participants such as institutional investors, regulators and others, are the driving forces behind the introduction of board evaluation Nicholson 2005, Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2007) .
The concept of accountability and value creation is often explained within the context of board role theories (Huse 2005) , where Agency Theory (Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen and Meckling 1976) , Stewardship Theory (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997, Stiles and Taylor 2001) , Stakeholder Theory (Freeman 1984) , and Resource Dependency Theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) , have been used to explain the roles of boards and the tasks they perform. Within this context, board effectiveness is achieved if expected and actual task align.
However, given the pluralistic approach adopted in this research, expected board performance has been identified through different perspectives on value creation and accountability (Huse 2005) , identifying three levels of board effectiveness: board performance, conformance to content, and conformance to context, as illustrated in However, this level of board effectiveness is identified based on the assumption that board evaluations do not have a negative effect on board effectiveness.
Applying this to the concept of board evaluation enables to link board accountability with board effectiveness by assuming that actual task performance can be compared to expected task performance to determine effectiveness (Huse 2007) . This is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Insert figure 2 about here Figure 2 shows that expected task performance is linked to actual task performance through board composition, structure, tasks and processes, all influencing actual task performance. Board evaluation links actual and expected task performance and may be used to measure if the two align. Based on this, three propositions can be presented: Given the lack of empirical research, the conceptual literature on board evaluation was used to build a framework for collecting and analyzing data, and through this the elements of a board evaluation process were identified (Rasmussen 2010) . They are presented in Figure 3 .
Insert figure 3 about here.
Factors influencing the decision to conduct a board evaluation
The main focus in the literature is on the benefit of board evaluations, arguing that board evaluations can clarify individual and collective roles and responsibilities (Graf 2007 , Conger, Finegold, and Lawler 1998 , Leblanc 2005 , Kazanjian 2000 , Julien and Rieger 2003 , improve relationships between board and management (Conger, Finegold, and Lawler 1998) , improve decision-making, enhance communication and operation, and improve leadership and teamwork (Long 2006) . The literature focuses less on rationale for initiating board evaluation.
Cadbury addresses the moral issue of conducting board evaluations "to maintain their competitive edge and to meet the expectations of investors" (Cadbury 2002:44) , while Huse and Gabrielsson (2012) identify the rationale related to value creation and transparency, arguing that board evaluations may "help aligning board task expectations and board task performance, and, in a transparency context, develop trusting relations between the board and important actors" (Huse and Gabrielsson 2012:245) Although it is not possible to say that board evaluations implemented as a consequence of recommendation cannot assess board performance, it is possible to assume 
Conducting the board evaluation
To the extent purpose is discussed, it is related to the importance of setting a purpose, enabling the board to decide on objectives against which the board can be measured (Conger, Finegold, and Lawler 1998 , Conger 2002 , Huse and Gabrielsson 2012 . Deciding on a purpose is important in order to identify relevant expectations, but also in terms of developing a process that will contribute to the purpose being achieved, conditioning who should be in charge of the process, the content, methods, and how to report on the results Huse 2007, Kiel and Nicholson 2005) . Minichilli et al (2007) categorize purposes as external if they are meant to satisfy external requirements such as the Codes, and internal if they relate to changing the conduct and behavior of the board in performing its work. Based on this categorization, some indicators of a board evaluation process that enable board effectiveness to be measured can be identified. If no purpose has been established or expectations identified, the possibility to compare actual to expected performance is eliminated, indicating that board evaluation is performed to conform to context; If the identified purpose and expectations satisfy external requirements, this indicates that board evaluation is performed to conform to content; If the identified purpose and expectations satisfy all important stakeholders, this indicates that board evaluations are performed to assess board performance.
Object of the board evaluation
The rationale behind evaluation of the board collectively is that it is the board as a group that will have the greatest possibility to influence board effectiveness (Cadbury 2002 Huse and Gabrielsson suggest that the content should be developed as a consequence of the purpose and within a value creation context, using different dimensions on board effectiveness, such as: "board tasks, board member and composition, board room culture, board-CEO relationship, board leadership," etc. (Huse and Gabrielsson 2012:246) . This suggestion may indicate to the following indications of board effectiveness: If the content of the board evaluation has been developed as a consequence of the purpose, board evaluation is performed to assess board performance, or to conform to content. If no link exists between purpose and content, evaluations are performed to conform to context.
The evaluator
The general view in the literature is that the choice of evaluator should be based on criteria identified as important for objectivity (Garratt 1997 , Kazanjian 2000 , Steinberg 2000 , Shultz 2009 ). Others argue that more subjective criteria should be used when deciding on the evaluator, such as the company's need for transparency and accountability Nicholson 2005, Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2007) . If a clear purpose of the board evaluation exists, the use of an external evaluator might indicate that objectivity is important, suggesting that board evaluations are performed to assess board performance or conform to content. If no clear purpose exists, the use of an external evaluator indicates evaluation is performed to conform to content or context. The combination of internal evaluator and no clear purpose indicates that evaluations are performed to conform to context.
Modality of the board evaluation
Modality means either how evaluations are performed or methods used. Evaluations can take the form of self-evaluations, peer-evaluations, or evaluation by management, all characterized as internal approaches. Evaluation can be performed by externals, such as the Nomination Committee, the share market, or other stakeholders (Huse, Minichilli, and 
Follow-up
Although there are some comments in the literature regarding the importance of results being materialized into an action plan (Sroufe and Naficy 2005 , Leblanc 2009 , Stein and Hewett 2008 , they are not specific about the content of this action plan, and who should be responsible for it. Leblanc (2005) argues that any follow-up should be an integrated part of a development program for the board, its committees and individual directors. Based on this, follow-up procedures should be identified if evaluations are performed to assess board performance or conform to content, assuming gaps between expected and actual performance exist. No follow-up procedure indicates that board evaluations are performed to conform to context.
Methods
The pluralistic approach adopted in the research is based on its ability to provide explanation about board evaluations as a mechanism to assess board effectiveness. The main method is multiple case studies of nine large listed companies in Norway. The decision to use multiplecase studies was based on the ability they give to gain a rich understanding of the context of the research and processes that are being enacted and the possibility they give to compare and generalize (Morris and Wood 1991) . The fact that boards are deviant, in terms of size, experience, background and the tasks they perform, adds to the possibility to generalize. The board evaluation process is the unit of analysis, and primary data were collected through interviews, using a standardized open-ended questionnaire to interview on average three board members in each company.
A non-probability sampling method was chosen; using the twenty one largest listed Norwegian companies based on market capitalization as of December 31st 2007 as sampling frame. The decision was based on the assumption that larger companies have greater motivation than smaller companies to comply with the Norwegian Code, given dispersed ownership, higher liquidity in the share, and greater attention by financial analysts. As indicated in the annual report of these companies, sixteen had performed a board evaluation in 2007. Letters were sent to the Chairpersons, and nine companies responded positively. Table   1 presents the sample in terms of number and market value compared to total number and market value of listed companies in Norway.
Insert table 1 here
The choice to use standardized open-ended questionnaires was made based on the advantage it represents when performing analysis (Patton 2002:346) , but also because it was considered important to increase the focus of the interviews, using the time as efficiently as possible. The choice of interviewees was influenced by certain characteristics of the Norwegian system of influencing composition of boards. In companies with more than 200 employees, the employees have the right to elect 1/3 of the board members. According to prevailing regulations for Norwegian listed companies (The Public Company Act), both women and men should be represented on boards in listed companies, each with at least 40% ( § 6-11a). Based on this information several categories of board members were selected to be included in the sample. The Chairperson was selected for her/his overall responsibility for board task performance. The employee-elected board member was selected based on the fact that he/she is not elected by the general meeting. Given the requirement of 40 % gender representation, one woman in each board was selected (these interviewees also met the conditions of independent board members identified in the Norwegian Code). Interviewing different categories enabled analysis at individual board member level, analysis per company, and analysis across companies as illustrated in table 2. However, in this research, the lowest level of analysis is company level.
Insert table 2 about here
Differences in perceptions among the interviewees regarding the evaluation process were identified, enabling gap analysis to be performed and to introduce possible reasons why these gaps exist. From this, an actual model of board evaluation at company level was identified. Given that evaluation processes were similar across companies, an aggregated model of the board evaluation process in Norwegian listed companies could be identified. Characteristics of this model were compared with the characteristics of the board evaluation process identified in the literature, making it possible to assess if board evaluation in large Norwegian listed companies measures board effectiveness.
Results

Factors influencing the decision to perform board evaluations.
Based on analysis, all companies implemented board evaluation as a consequence of the recommendation in the Norwegian Code, as expressed by one of the chairpersons: "It's primarily to follow the recommendations, and it has given some useless information and also some things that, of course, I think are… ok" (Chairperson, or CP) .
Purpose of the evaluation
The analyses show that no clear purpose of the board evaluation is decided. Between two and four different purposes were identified within each board. Many chairpersons indicate "development" or "improvement" as the purpose, without giving any explanation as to which area(s) of the board's work this refers to, or how expected performance was identified:
"I would say it more generally that it's quite simply a chance to evaluate and improve our efforts" (CP).
This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all but one board member stated that no discussions regarding purpose had been undertaken: 
Object of the evaluation
The object of all of the implemented board evaluations was the collective board. None of the boards conducted an individual evaluation, nor did they evaluate sub-committees. 
Content of the board evaluation
The evaluator
An external evaluator was chosen by 33 percent of the companies. The choice of evaluator is not linked to the possibility it gives for objectivity or to design a system which fits the purpose, as identified through the following statements:. However, 47.5 percent of board members not currently using external evaluators would prefer this, indicating that an external evaluator is closely related to external accountability issues.
Modality used in the evaluation
The main method used is a quantitative survey where the individual board members evaluate the board collectively by giving scores (Between 1-5) to given statements regarding the board's work. Although a quantitative approach is used, board members within the same board disagree on what score constitutes expected performance:
"It all depends on what you measure" (IBM1). "(What is goal achievement?) 3 and 4 if you are satisfied. 5 is very good" (IBM2).
Follow-up
The studied boards have not implemented any procedure for follow-up of the results, as indicated by these quotes: 
Discussion
Based on analysis, certain characteristics of the board evaluation process in Norwegian listed companies can be identified and used as indicators of level of board effectiveness. All companies conducted board evaluations once a year as recommended in the Norwegian Code, indicating that board evaluations are performed to conform to content or context.
Little effort has been made in designing a board evaluation process with a clear purpose and a system which might fit the purpose. Board evaluation is designed based on a wish to implement a simple, short, and inexpensive process. Given that the clearest purpose was benchmarking, this indicates that evaluations are performed to conform to context. shown that board evaluations measure board performance, and there are weak indications to suggest that board evaluations are performed to conform to content. This conclusion is supported by the following quote:
We feel we have an obligation to do that, because it is stated in the recommendation and if we don't do it, we must come up with a good explanation as to why not, God knows what that explanation would look like" (CP).
Resource dependency theory (Stiles and Taylor 2001) , and Institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977) can offer some explanation regarding the implemented board evaluation process in Norwegian large listed companies. Boards perform board evaluations because there is external pressure to do this. By seeking links with its environment, the board tries to regulate interdependence in terms of reducing uncertainty and transaction costs associated with this dependency. The choice not to conduct the board evaluation might create such an uncertainty, as indicated by the above comment from the chairperson. However, the implemented board evaluation process may be characterized as a process where designing a process is the goal, which is performed to conform to context. Analyses show that board members have little knowledge about the rationale behind the developed board evaluation process, and little possibility to influence it. Regardless, they are very satisfied with the implemented process, indicating that board evaluations might represent value creation for boards. Future studies should explore this concept through investigation into the approaches individual board members have towards board evaluation. The relative level of board effectiveness identified in this research might be explored further by comparing boards that do not perform evaluations with board that do.
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